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“Street Politics” in South Korea Surrounding Yoon’s Impeachment Ruling
Sheewon Min
A large number of frustrated South Koreans have gathered in Seoul to demand the removal of conservative leader Yoon, citing frustration over the delay of the Constitutional Court’s trial. The fallout from last December’s martial law declaration by President Yoon Suk Yeol, who was impeached by the Democratic Party (DP)-controlled parliament in December for violating his constitutional duties, has deepened divisions between conservatives and liberals, strained public institutions, and paralyzed policymaking. The prolonged delay in trial announcements has intensified public polarization, fueling the growing phenomenon of “street politics” and further widening societal rifts.
South Korea’s “street politics” have historically played a crucial role in the country’s democratic development, with the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye serving as a notable example. Through peaceful candlelight protests, South Koreans successfully led her impeachment, demonstrating the resilience of democracy. However, while the protests over Park's impeachment were relatively unified, those surrounding Yoon’s trial are increasingly divided, highlighting deep public polarization. This division has been further exacerbated by the Constitutional Court's postponement of the impeachment trial.
On March 11, the DP initiated a large-scale street protest in Gwanghwamun, Seoul, calling for President Yoon's removal from office. In response, pro-Yoon lawmakers from the ruling People Power Party (PPP) began a 24-hour relay demonstration in front of the Constitutional Court, urging the dismissal of the impeachment case. While there have been increasing calls for unity and respect for the court’s decision, critics argue that both sides are exacerbating national divisions through escalating street politics. The DP, joined by smaller progressive groups, has organized sit-ins and hunger strikes, with some lawmakers even shaving their heads in symbolic protest. Meanwhile, PPP lawmakers continue their demonstrations, asserting that the dismissal of the impeachment is necessary to restore the nation’s legal order.
Street politics, once a symbol of democratic resilience and unified political pursuit in South Korea, now embody the country’s fragmented, divided, and chaotic political landscape. This shift threatens the long-term stability of South Korean politics and challenges the Constitutional Court’s role in bridging deep political and societal rifts.
South Korea Dispatches Trade Minister to Washington Amidst Mounting Trade War
Sophia Shum Gagnier
South Korea’s trade minister, Cheong In-kyo, arrived in Washington D.C. on March 13 to discuss recent tariffs on steel and aluminum products imported from South Korea to the United States, and to seek clarity on the looming “reciprocal tariffs” slated to be imposed on April 2. In statements to the press at Dulles Airport in Washington, Cheong outlined his plan to “[discuss] the strategic advantage of South Korea with the US side” and encourage the US “to take a step beneficial to our country" while designing its reciprocal tariff schedules. This highlights South Korea’s desire to maintain active communication with the United States amid a rise in trade protectionism, but also highlights the limits of Seoul’s efforts as the country endures a leadership vacuum at home.
The reciprocal tariff plans pose the most significant concern for South Korea. In a recent address to Congress, President Trump falsely claimed that “South Korea’s average tariff is four times higher” than U.S. tariffs on South Korean products. This comment is likely derived from South Korea’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate on U.S. goods under the World Trade Organization, which is approximately 13%. However, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) supersedes MFN rates for all goods that it covers, setting South Korea’s real effective tariff rate to 0.79%. South Korean concern arises from the fact that whether MFN or KORUS rates will be used in the calculation of reciprocal tariffs remains unknown.
Independent of the apparent confusion over MFN rates, Trump administration officials have further announced their intentions to consider “non-tariff barriers, currency manipulation, unfair funding, [and] labor suppression” in deciding tariff response rates. The exact weight to be given to these different categories in the calculation of the final tariff rates has yet to be disclosed, leaving much opacity to the future of U.S.-South Korea trade relations. Indeed, Kevin Hassett, director of the White House National Economic Council, admitted that “uncertainty” is to be expected until Trump’s reciprocal tariffs are planned to enter into effect on April 2. This is bad news for South Korea. One South Korean think tank projected before Trump’s election that his return, and subsequent reimposition of tariffs, would cause South Korean exports to diminish by as much as USD 44.8 billion and GDP could shrink by 0.67%.
Amid these mounting trade policy concerns, South Korea is maximizing its efforts within a set of intense constraints to mitigate any negative outcomes. The country still awaits the Constitutional Court’s decision on President Yoon’s impeachment and the election of a new leader will likely not take place until May. While Trade Minister Cheong’s meetings and the upcoming visit of Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun to Washington represent pointed endeavors to maintain communication and tee-up fruitful negotiations with the Trump administration despite the ongoing leadership vacuum in Seoul, only time will tell if such moves will be sufficient to keep South Korea at least mostly out of the White House’s crosshairs.
Today in Korean History
On March 22, 2001, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung made a formal apology for past political repression and human rights abuses, particularly during military rule. Kim himself had been a victim of authoritarian crackdowns before becoming a leader of South Korea’s democratic transition.