News

South Korean President Heads to Japan for First Dedicated Leaders’ Summit

Alexander Eid

Between January 13-14, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung will make his second visit to Japan since taking office in June 2025. While there, he will hold his first dedicated summit with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, building on the two leaders’ quick sideline engagements during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) High Level Week in October and the G20 Summit in November. The trip will mark a key opportunity for Seoul and Tokyo to devote focused attention to their bilateral relationship under their respective new governments. It will also help shape regional geopolitical dynamics as rising tension between China and Japan complicate South Korea’s positioning.

On the first day in Takaichi’s home prefecture of Nara, Lee will likely broach strengthening bilateral technology cooperation, particularly in strategic sectors such as AI and semiconductors, as well as South Korea’s ban on Japanese seafood imports near Fukushima and its potential accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Additionally, with the Lee administration renewing efforts to reengage Pyongyang this year, collaboration on North Korea-related issues is also anticipated.

On the second day of his trip, Lee will meet Takaichi again at the Horyuji Buddhist temple and, separately, preside over a gathering of South Koreans living in Japan before returning home. According to South Korean National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac, Lee may also visit the grave of late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, an unprecedented move that would go a long way toward solidifying ties with Abe’s self-appointed successor: Takaichi. However, such a move, as well as discussing outstanding “history issues” like Japan’s use of forced Korean labor during World War II, could exacerbate political backlash from either side. 

From a broader perspective, the visit comes amid escalating tension between Beijing and Tokyo over regional security issues – primarily Taiwan. Beijing recently unveiled a suite of new restrictions on Japanese trade, including export controls on “dual-use” items and an anti-dumping investigation into imports of certain Japanese products used in semiconductor manufacturing. For his part, Lee indicated that Seoul would seek to avoid entanglement in ongoing China-Japan tension and framed China-Japan-South Korea trilateral ties as “equally important” to the U.S.-South Korea-Japan relationship. This reflects Lee’s trademark “pragmatism” in his approach to foreign relations.

However, as tensions escalate, Lee’s ability to hedge will be tested, particularly as wider shifts in the global trade landscape accentuate the instability already at play in Northeast Asia. In this way, the Lee-Takaichi summit will serve as a key watchpoint amid a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

The Xi–Lee Summit: The Recalibration of China–South Korea Relations?

Sheewon Min

On January 5, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing during Lee’s state visit to China. The meeting, the first head-of-state diplomacy for both countries in the new year, underscored the renewed importance attached to China–South Korea relations by the governments of both countries. President Xi emphasized that his repeated exchanges with Lee, following the pair’s meeting on the sidelines of APEC in November, reflected mutual commitment to bilateral ties, highlighting a shared historical emphasis on peace, “harmony without uniformity,” and pragmatic cooperation despite differences in political systems and ideology.

President Lee framed the bilateral relationship within a rapidly transforming international environment characterized by heightened uncertainty and turbulence. Reflecting concerns over the rise of protectionism and unilateralism, often associated with recent U.S. foreign policy trends under the “America First” approach, he called for joint opposition to protectionist practices and renewed commitment to genuine multilateralism. Within this broader strategic vision, Lee emphasized South Korea’s interest in deepening economic and trade cooperation with China, expressing particular interest in seizing opportunities presented by China’s forthcoming 15th Five-Year Plan, and voiced support for China’s hosting of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting this year. 

Beyond economic and institutional cooperation, the discussions also extended to cultural and maritime domains. On the cultural front, the South Korean side raised the possibility of leasing additional giant pandas, a well-established instrument of Chinese public diplomacy symbolizing the depth of bilateral goodwill. More sensitively, the two sides addressed the Yellow Sea issue, sharing an interest in preserving the area as a zone of peace and cooperation and agreeing to continue constructive dialogue over concerns regarding illegal maritime structures constructed by China, thereby underscoring a mutual preference for managing disputes through diplomatic channels.

Notably, President Lee reaffirmed South Korea’s adherence to the one-China policy, explicitly recognizing China’s core interests, including on the Taiwan issue. This marked a contrast with the previous Yoon administration, whose statements on Taiwan had drawn criticism from Beijing, and suggests a recalibration toward greater diplomatic alignment with China.

The summit also addressed regional security, particularly North Korea. President Lee requested China’s constructive role in facilitating inter-Korean engagement, with President Xi emphasizing the need for strategic patience regarding Pyongyang. The absence of a joint statement following consecutive summits, however, indicates lingering divergences in expectations.

Finally, President Lee characterized the visit as a “crucial opportunity” for the full restoration of bilateral relations, a message symbolically reinforced through informal diplomatic gestures. Nevertheless, South Korea’s diplomatic balancing act remains highly complex, as intensifying China–Japan tensions and Seoul’s security alliance with the United States continue to constrain its strategic choices. In this context, Lee’s scheduled meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi, set to take place only days after the Xi–Lee summit, highlights the immediacy of these competing diplomatic pressures. Achieving a sustainable and consistent China policy, capable of reconciling regional tensions with alliance commitments, will therefore remain a central challenge for South Korean diplomacy in 2026.

Speaker Woo Urges Swift Revision on Referendum Act Ahead of Constitutional Talks

Amy Han

National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik said on January 7 that bipartisan discussions on constitutional reform are likely to begin following the first court ruling in the insurrection trial involving former President Yoon Suk Yeol, urging lawmakers to swiftly amend the Referendum Act in preparation.

At a National Assembly forum, Woo noted that despite the Constitutional Court’s 2014 ruling that the Act is unconstitutional, it has yet to be revised. He added that the Constitution, last amended in 1987, no longer fully reflects South Korea’s political and social realities.

Additionally, Woo stated that as the rebellion-related trial approaches a first-instance ruling, conditions may emerge for the ruling and opposition parties to reopen talks on constitutional revision, including the possible formation of a special committee. He noted, however, that the public would find it unacceptable if such discussions remain stalled simply because the Referendum Act has not been revised.

Woo stressed that amending the Act is essential to allow a gradual, consensus-based approach to constitutional reform. He identified several areas with bipartisan potential, including adding the spirit of the May 18 Democratization Movement to the Constitution’s preamble, clearly requiring National Assembly approval for emergency martial law, and enshrining balanced regional development ahead of the June local elections.

He then added that these proposals could gain cross-party support, particularly after the first court ruling in former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s trial, and emphasized that revising the National Referendum Act should not be postponed, as resolving its unconstitutional status is the minimum prerequisite for meaningful constitutional reform.

However, given the lack of immediate momentum between the ruling and opposition parties to initiate constitutional reform talks, it appears unlikely that a new constitution can be drafted before the local elections this June. Accordingly, there is growing skepticism that a national referendum could be held alongside the elections.

This Week in Korean History

On January 12, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a crucial speech to the National Press Club entitled “On the Far East” in which he outlined what would become known as the “First Island Chain,” a concept that defined the United States’ defensive perimeter in the Asia-Pacific as stretching from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Notably, the First Island Chain excluded Korea, despite U.S. forces’ occupation of the southern part of the peninsula between 1945-1948 and Washington’s instrumental role in setting up the pro-U.S. Syngman Rhee administration as a counter to the Soviet-backed Kim Il Sung government in the north. This suggested that Washington would not seek to defend the Rhee-led south in the event of communist aggression, but U.S. President Harry Truman reversed this position just five months later in response to what he saw as a fundamental defiance of the newly created international order under the United Nations.